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Developments In The Duty To
Bargain Under The Pennsylvania




In June of 1968 the Governor's Commission to Revise the Pub-
lic Employe Law of Pennsylvania, the Hickman Commission, rec-
ommended that the existing law "be replaced by an entirely new law
governing relationships between public employers and employes."'
In a marked departure from traditional public employee relations,
the Commission recommended that the new law "recognize the right
of all public employes, including police and firemen, to bargain col-
lectively, subject to enumerated safeguards."2
Among the safeguards recommended by the Commission was a
more limited duty to bargain than exists in the private sector. While
it was suggested that public employers be required to bargain re-
garding wages, hours and conditions of employment, the Commis-
sion proposed that the duty to bargain be "qualified by a recognition
of existing laws dealing with aspects of the same subject matter and
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1. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUB-
LIC EMPLOYE LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE 1968, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS, 2.
2. Id. at 3.
by a carefully defined reservation of managerial rights."3
The Public Employe Relations Act (PERA),4 enacted in July of
1970, incorporated the Hickman Commission recommendations re-
garding the duty to bargain in sections 701, 702 and 703.1 Perhaps
inevitably, Article VII of that Act did not precisely delineate the
matters that are subject to collective bargaining or those that remain
within the exclusive control of management. The provisions of the
Act pertaining to the duty to bargain left a great deal of scope for
judicial interpretation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first dealt with the interpreta-
tion of sections 701, 702 and 703 in PLRB v. State College Area
School District.' In the State College opinion the court attempted to
resolve the inherent conflict between section 701, defining the topics
that are subject to bargaining, and section 702, defining the matters
left to management discretion by means of a balancing test. The
court held that
where an item of dispute is a matter of fundamental concern to the
employes' interest in wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment, it is not removed as a matter subject to good faith
barsaining under Section 701 simply because it may touch upon
basic policy. It is the duty of the board in the first instance and the
courts thereafter to determine whether the impact of the issue on
the interest of the employe in wages, hours and terms and condi-
tions of employment outweighs its probable affect on the basic
policy of the system as a whole. If it is determined that the matter
is one of inherent managerial policy but does effect wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment, the public employer
3. Id.
4. Act of July 23, 1970, P. L. 563, No. 195 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
1101.101-.1201 (Purdon Supp. 1979)).
5. Section 701. Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation
of the public employer and the representative of the public employes to meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question
arising thereunder and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agree-
ment reached but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession.
Id. at § 1101.701.
Section 702. Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inher-
ent managerial policy, which shall include but shall not be limited to such areas of
discretion or policy as the functions and programs of the public employer, standards
of services, its overall budget, utilization of technology, the organizational structure
and selection and direction of personnel. Public employers, however, shall be re-
quired to meet and discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon upon request by public em-
ploye representatives.
Id. at § 1101.702.
Section 703. The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or imple-
ment a provision m a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that
provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute
or statutes enacted by the General Assembly and the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania or the provisions of municipal home rule charters.
Id. at § 1101.703.
6. 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
shall be required to meet and discuss such subject upon request by
the public employe's representative pursuant to Section 702.7
The court in State College also chose to adopt a narrower view
of section 703 than that proposed by the commonwealth court.8 In
the court's view section 703 did not constitute a further definition of
"inherent managerial policy" as set forth in section 702, but rather
represented an effort to retain the continuing vitality of existing law.
As a consequence, that a subject is covered by legislation does not
necessarily remove it from collective bargaining. When a public em-
ployer is given discretion in a particular area by statute, the em-
ployer may agree to restrict that discretion in a collective bargaining
agreement. It is only when a statute mandates a particular condition
or decision-making process to the exclusion of all others that the
topic is excluded from collective bargaining by section 703. 9
The State College decision established the general framework
for the interpretation of sections 701, 702 and 703. In June of 1978
the Report of the Governor's Study Commission on Public Employe
Relations, after reviewing seven years of experience under PERA,
recommended maintenance of the status quo with regard to the duty
to bargain under the Act,' 0 and specifically affirmed "the balancing
test established by the State Supreme Court in the State College case
as the most appropriate manner of resolving scope of bargaining
questions."' The Commission proposed that further definition of
the duty to bargain be left to the PLRB and the courts. It was sug-
gested that questions regarding the duty to bargain were better re-
solved through litigation than by legislative action.' 2
This Article examines the significant litigation concerning the
duty to bargain under PERA. The primary focus is on aspects of the
bargaining obligation outside of the context of the negotiation of a
collective bargaining agreement. It is in these areas that Penn-
sylvania's public sector labor law differs most from the federal pri-
vate sector labor law. Moreover, these areas are the ones that will
most likely be an expensive snare for the unwary public employer.
II. Subcontracting and the Duty to Bargain
The question whether there will be subcontracting of work for-
7. Id. at 507, 337 A.2d at 268.
8. See PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 306 A.2d 404
(1973), remanded, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
9. Id.
10. GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC EMPLOYE RELATIONS, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, June 1, 1978, pp. 19-20. A minority of the Commis-
sion recommended changes to Section 703. Id.
11. Id. at 19.
12. Id.
merly performed by bargaining unit members is an emotionally
charged issue for both union and public employer. Subcontracting,
by its very nature, threatens the livelihood of individual employees
and the collective strength of the employee representative organiza-
tion. From the viewpoint of the public employer, however, subcon-
tracting of work often offers a less expensive means of providing
services. Whether or not the subcontracting is permissible turns on
whether the public employer bargained in good faith on the issue. It
is not surprising that a specialized and somewhat complicated law
regarding this aspect of the public employer's duty to bargain devel-
oped under PERA.
A. The Duty to Bargain Over Subcontracting
The initial question presented in Borough of Wilkinsburg v. De-
partment of Sanitation'3 was whether the decision to subcontract re-
quired bargaining or merely a discussion of the decision with the
union. Under PERA when a matter is one of inherent managerial
policy, the public employer need only "meet and discuss" with the
union, and the final decision rests within the public employer's dis-
cretion. '
4
In Wilkinsburg the borough, during negotiations for a new con-
tract, raised the issue of subcontracting sanitation services. The bor-
ough also sought bids for sanitation services during negotiations,
made the union aware of the substance of the bids and then bar-
gained to impasse with the union over possible concessions that
would have reduced the cost of continuing the sanitation service by
the borough's employees as an alternative to contracting out the
work. After negotitating for several months on the issue and reach-
ing impasse, the borough subcontracted the work and discharged all
the employees in its sanitation department. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the PLRB that dismissed the
unfair practice charges, held that there was a duty to bargain the
contracting out of work previously performed by bargaining unit
employees, and found that the borough met that duty by bargaining
to impasse.15
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
subcontracting in PLRB v. Mars Area School District.6 In Mars the
13. 463 Pa. 521, 345 A.2d 641 (1975).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
15. The PLRB dismissed all charges; however, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny
County held that a violation of Section 1201(a)(5) had occurred. The Commwealth Court, in
16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 640, 330 A.2d 306 (1974), reversed the Common Pleas decision and held
that no section 1201(a)(5) violation had occurred and also held that there was only a duty to
meet and confer under section 702, not a duty to bargain under section 701, on the subject of
subcontracting.
16. 480 Pa. 295, 389 A.2d 1073 (1978).
school district reached agreement on the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement covering teacher-aides, which was to become ef-
fective on July 1, 1972. The school district had used, during at least
the school year prior to 1972, both paid teacher-aides and volunteers
to do essentially the same type of work. Four days before the collec-
tive bargaining agreement became effective, the school district uni-
laterally terminated all of the paid teacher-aides for "economic
reasons" but continued to use the nonpaid volunteers. Although
there was disagreement between the parties and among the Justices
7
regarding whether the volunteers replaced the paid teacher-aides,
everyone agreed that no bargaining had occurred on the matter of
the termination of the eleven paid teacher-aides.
In discussing whether the termination in the Mars situation was
a bargainable matter or a meet and discuss matter, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court applied the balancing test of PLRB v. State College
Area School District.'8 In its application of the State College test,
the court in Mars found that the termination had "an immediate and
direct impact" upon a "matter of fundamental concern to the em-
ploye's interest" in wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment, that the policy to provide assistance to teachers had not
changed, and therefore, that the termination's impact on the wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment of the teacher-
aides far outweighed any managerial policy considerations.' 9 Stat-
ing that it could not "allow the public employer's economic concerns
always to outweigh those of its employees," and that allowing public
employers to take such unilateral action for economic reasons would
encourage "the very discord in the public sector that PERA was
designed to alleviate," the court reinstated the decision of the PLRB
which had held that the failure to bargain on such a subject violated
section 1201(a)(1) and (5) of PERA.2 ° The court also noted in its
decision that volunteers (and implictly subcontractors) need not take
over each and every duty of the employees being replaced or termi-
nated, but need only substantially perform the duties of the former
employees.
Read together, Wilkinsburg and Mars clearly establish that sub-
17. See id. at 304, 389 A.2d at 1077 (Pomeroy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
18. 461 Pa. 494, 507, 337 A.2d 258, 268 (1975). See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Pomeroy concurred in part and dissented in part in State College. His opinion set forth
the following test:
If the effect of the granting or denial of a request (for bargaining) would be more
direct, immediate and substantial upon the teachers' individual performance of their
duties than it would upon the school board's overall operation of an educational
system, the item should be considered negotiable.
461 Pa. at 515, 337 A.2d at 272 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting).
19. PLRB v. Mars Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 295, 300, 389 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1978).
20. Id. at 301, 389 A.2d at 1076.
contracting of work formerly done by bargaining unit employees is a
bargainable item under section 701 of PERA. These two cases also
establish several other principles relating to subcontracting that must
be followed by public employers contemplating subcontracting. The
Wilkinsburg opinion establishes the principle that if the parties are
in negotiations and the employer informs the union of its intent to
consider subcontracting, shares the bid information received from
potential subcontractors with the union, and after sharing the infor-
mation, bargains in good faith to impasse over employer proposed
concessions that would reduce the bargaining agreement costs to a
level comparable with the subcontract bids, the employer may then
subcontract and not be found guilty of an unfair labor practice.
Mars indicates that when there is no policy change involved in the
replacement of paid employees by volunteers, 21 and the decision is
purely one of economics, bargaining is still required and unilateral
termination is an unfair labor practice.
B. The Duty to Bargain After Negotiation of a Labor Agreement
Several subsequent cases discuss and develop the balancing test
of State College as applied to subcontracting, and provide a more
complete outline of both employer and union duties concerning sub-
contracting under PERA. In PLRB v. North Hills School District
22
the school district had, during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement, contracted out work previously done by school district
bus drivers. The agreement was silent on the issue of subcontracting,
and without any meaningful meetings, notice to the union or bar-
gaining on the subcontracting issue, the school board unilaterally
subcontracted the work and terminated its employees.
Both the PLRB and the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny
County found that the district was simply changing the method of
implementing the policy of providing bus transportation for its stu-
dents, not changing or eliminating the policy.2 3 Because the termi-
nations had a fundamental effect on the wages, salaries, and other
terms and conditions of employment of the employees, and this im-
pact outweighed any effect on the employer's policy, the failure to
bargain was held to be an unfair practice.24
Although North Hills reiterates the established rule that subcon-
21. Justice Pomeroy reasoned that there was a removal of paid employees, and a contin-
uation of the volunteer employees. Id. at 309, 389 A.2d at 1080 (Pomeroy, J.).
22. 8 P.P.E.R. 208 (C.P. Allegheny 1977), afjg 7 P.P.E.R. 121 and 7 P.P.E.R. 44 (PLRB
1976).
23. Id. The PLRB and the court also held that had the school district entirely terminated
the school bus service for its students it would still have had an obligation to meet and discuss
the effects of that policy change on the employees in accordance with section 702 of PERA, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
24. See also McKeesport Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 153 (PLRB 1975).
tracting is a mandatory subject for bargaining under section 701 of
PERA, it greatly amplifies and outlines the employer's duty to notify
the union, and the union's corresponding duty to request bargaining.
As stated by the PLRB, the employer's duty is "an affirmative duty
to seek out the Association, give the details of the subcontracting
proposal it was considering and request the Association to make a
counter-proposal."25 In North Hills the district asserted among other
things that the association had waived its right to bargain the sub-
contracting issue during the contract negotiations. Although the
PLRB and the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County agreed
that the union had an obligation to request bargaining when it re-
ceived notice of the possibility of subcontracting by the employer, it
held that indirect indications to the union that the district was look-
ing into subcontracting were not sufficient to put the union on notice
and thereby create an obligation on the union to request bargaining
on the subject. In the PLRB's opinion, when the union receives ac-
tual knowledge of the bid specifications in sufficient time to raise the
issue in contract negotiations, even though the employer did not offi-
cially provide the information and thereby breached its duty to bar-
gain in good faith, the union must enforce its rights by requesting
collective bargaining on the issue. The union may not simply file an
unfair practice charge later.
In Garnet Valley School District," a case almost identical to
North Hills, the union did receive actual knowledge of subcontract
bid specifications from a source other than the employer during ne-
gotiations for a new contract, and acquired that knowledge prior to
the actual subcontracting. Even though the union notified the dis-
trict of its objection to the possible subcontracting, it did not raise the
issue at the bargaining table and made no counter-proposals to the
bid specifications during negotiations. Because the union failed to
meet its duty to raise and negotiate the subcontracting issue, the
PLRB modified the remedy it originally awarded, rescinded its order
to reinstate the terminated employees with back pay,27 and merely
required the district to bargain over the subcontracting issue.
28
A different result from those of North Hills, McKeesport and
Garnet Valley was reached in Rostraver Townshp.2 9 In that case the
25. North Hills School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 44, 47 (PLRB 1976).
26. 8 P.P.E.R. 277, remedy revised, 8 P.P.E.R. 365 (PLRB 1977).
27. In both McKeesport and North Hills, the PLRB ordered reinstatement with backpay.
28. See also Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 9065 (PLRB 1978) (no meaningful bar-
gaining before subcontracting, failure to seek out and notify the union of the details of the
subcontracting proposal, and union action sufficient to constitute a request to bargain the is-
sue); Phoenixville Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9268 (PLRB 1978) (failure to seek out and
notify the union of the details of the subcontracting proposal, failure of the union to demand
bargaining).
29. 7 P.P.E.R. 176 (PLRB 1976).
township adopted an alternative means of providing a service30 that
the township had determined through a policy decision it would pro-
vide for its citizens. In contrast to the actions of the school districts,
the township did formally notify the union during negotiations for a
new contract that it was considering contracting the work out, and
indicated that it apparently could effectuate substantial savings by
subcontracting. The township also made several negotiation propos-
als that would have made the agreement costs to the township com-
parable with the subcontracting bid costs. The union made no
counter-proposals except to dismiss the township proposals out-of-
hand, and did not request a copy of the subcontracting bid being
considered by the township. On these facts the PLRB held that the
township attempted to bargain the issue with an open mind, pro-
vided sufficient notice of consideration of subcontracting, sought
union counter-proposals, and therefore, bargained in good faith
before contracting out the bargaining unit work and eliminating bar-
gaining unit jobs. Thus, the union was found to have waived its
right to bargain the subcontracting.
Another aspect of the duty to bargain over subcontracting is dis-
cussed in School District of the Township of Micreek.31 Here the
district advertised for bids for subcontracting janitorial and mowing
services. Even though no action was taken by the district on the
bids, the union asserted that bargaining or discussions should have
taken place prior to the advertisement for bids. The PLRB stated
that it regarded preliminary exploratory employer inquiries into sub-
contracting that are "made for the purpose of determining whether
subcontracting is a viable alternative [as] a necessary prerequisite to
intelligent bargaining. ' 32 By so holding, the PLRB indicated that
the employer had the right to take necessary steps to investigate and
evaluate the potential merits of subcontracting before being obli-
gated to notify the union of the possibility of such action. The deci-
sion also indicates that there is no need to negotiate or meet and
discuss before taking such investigatory actions. Of course, once
bids have been received and it has been determined that subcontract-
ing is a viable option, the employer will have to seek out the union to
notify it that subcontracting is being considered, provide the specifics
of any bids, and negotiate on the subject. At the same time, the em-
ployer will have to remain receptive to counter-proposals, unless the
union by word or deed indicates it is not interested in bargaining.
30, The service in Rostraver was dispatching/communication as opposed to school bus
service in North Hills and McKeesport, and part time custodial service in Garnet Valley.
31. 9 P.P.E.R. 9136 (PLRB 1978).
32. Id. at 295.
C The Effect of Collectively Bargained Waiver Clauses
Collectively bargained waiver and integration clauses are dis-
cussed in greater depth later in this article,33 but an examination of
the effect of such provisions on the obligation to bargain over sub-
contracting is in order. The PLRB recently addressed the issue of
whether or not the duty to bargain could be waived by a general
clause in a collective bargaining agreement that waives the right to
bargain over any and all matters, whether discussed or not in the
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement.34
The PLRB, by its decisions in recent waiver clause-duty to bar-
gain cases, 35 committed itself to a position that required a finding of
no duty to bargain over subcontracting during the term of the agree-
ment when the existing agreement contains a broad Waynesboro-
type waiver or "zipper" clause. To rule otherwise would have re-
quired the PLRB to create one category of subjects that are bargain-
able, and to which the provisions of a broad waiver clause would
apply, and a second category of bargainable subjects, to which the
provisions of a broad waiver clause would not apply.
Neither the provisions of Article VII of PERA nor any Penn-
sylvania court decisions suggest or contemplate such a distinction
between section 701 issues on which there is a duty to bargain.
Therefore, the PLRB properly found no duty to bargain over sub-
contracting during the term of a collective bargaining agreement be-
cause the agreement contained a broad waiver and integration or
"zipper" clause. Distinguishing between the effect of such a provi-
sion when subcontracting rather than some other bargainable item is
implicated would have required the PLRB to adopt the erroneous
rationale that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement in-
tended that their waiver clause mean different things depending on
whether the matter in dispute was subcontracting or any other bar-
gainable matter. Implicit in such a rationale is the patronizing as-
sumption that one of the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
could not and did not freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waive its
right to bargain, no matter how clear and emphatic the waiver of
bargaining rights might be.
D. Recapitulation
It is clear from both the court and PLRB decisions that there
is a duty to bargain, not simply to "meet and discuss," before
subcontracting work previously performed by bargaining unit
33. See Section V infra.
34. Harrisburg School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 10116 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Waynesboro Area Bd. of School Dirs., 9 P.P.E.R. 9066 (PLRB 1978) and
10 P.P.E.R. 10048 (PLRB 1979).
employees. An analysis of the PLRB decisions reveals that the
following steps must be taken by the public employer in order to
fulfill its bargaining obligation. The employer must:
(a) Inform the union of its intent to consider subcontract-
ing;
(b) Seek out the union and provide the union with copies
of the subcontracting bids being considered;
(c) Request the union to make a counter-proposal to the
bids and give the union a reasonable amount of time to
develop its proposal;
(d) Negotiate in good faith with an open mind over the
counter-proposals made by the union and seek conces-
sions that will bring the agreement cost reasonably in
line with the subcontract cost.
The union must also be diligent in protecting the rights of its mem-
bership, and it must make a meaningful effort to engage in bargain-
ing. The union must:
(1) After learning, either from the employer directly or
through some indirect means, of the employer's intent
to consider subcontracting, demand that the employer
bargain over the subcontracting;
(2) Make counter-proposals to the subcontracting bids;
(3) Negotiate in good faith to try to reach agreement on
terms that will eliminate the need to subcontract the
work.
Failure to follow the above steps by the employer, and timely
filing of an unfair practice charge by the union, will result in a find-
ing of an unfair practice by the PLRB that might require reinstate-
ment with backpay of terminated bargaining unit employees, in
addition to an order to bargain over subcontracting. If the union
failed to demand bargaining, the PLRB is likely to order bargaining
without requiring the reinstatement of terminated employees as part
of its remedial order.
After following the above steps, if the employer and union are
at impasse in negotiations, the employer may subcontract the work
and terminate the bargaining unit employees whose work was sub-
contracted. Additionally, in those situations in which subcontracting
is contemplated during the term of an existing agreement, and the
agreement contains no language barring subcontracting of work, but
does contain a broad waiver or "zipper" clause, it would appear that
there is no duty to bargain before subcontracting the work.
The PLRB and the courts properly interpreted and applied the
provisions of PERA to the issue of subcontracting. Although there
may be disagreement regarding whether the balancing test of the
majority in Slate College or the test proposed by Justice Pomeroy is
the appropriate test to apply in duty to bargain situations,36 it is clear
that in the case of subcontracting the impact on the employee will
almost always outweigh the impact on the policy determinations of
the public employer. Therefore, the requirements outlined above are
not likely to be modified in future cases.
III. Job Classification and the Duty to Bargain
The question whether there is a duty to bargain over the job
classification of employees or the reclassification of employees' posi-
tions is less developed than the subcontracting issue. In PLRB v.
Commonwealth37 a dispute arose when the Commonwealth reclassi-
fied a number of positions with the result that after reclassification
the positions were in a bargaining unit represented by a different
union. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME), which represented the employees prior to
the reclassification, charged that the public employer's unilateral
reclassification violated either the duty to bargain under section
1201 (a)(5)3" or the duty to meet and discuss under section 1201 (a)(9)
of PERA.39
In the unfair practice proceeding, the PLRB determined that the
employer's reclassification fell within the*scope of the term "direc-
tion of personnel"' in the definition of management rights in section
702. In the PLRB's view '[a]n employer is free to reclassify employes
and direct these employes in the performance of their jobs without
an obligation to bargain with the bargaining representative."'" Al-
though the reclassification was considered to be a matter of "inher-
ent managerial policy," section 702 required the employer to meet
and discuss with the union.4 2 That is, when a matter of inherent
managerial policy directly affects the employees' fundamental inter-
est in wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, there
is no duty to bargain, but there is an obligation to meet and discuss
with the bargaining representative of the public employees.
Although the Commonwealth violated its meet and discuss obli-
gation in this case by unilaterally reclassifying rank-and-file job po-
sitions, it did not violate its meet and discuss obligation by
36. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
37. 9 P.P.E.R. 9061 and 9165 (PLRB 1978).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
39. Id. at § 1201(a)(9).
40. Id. at § 1101.1201(a)(9).
41. PLRB v. Commonwealth, 9 P.P.E.R. 906 at 120.
42. Section 702 of PERA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp. 1979), pro-
vides in pertinent part that "[plublic employers ... shall be required to meet and discuss on
policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as well as the
impact thereon upon request by public employe representatives."
unilaterally reclassifying positions in a first level supervisory bar-
gaining unit. Section 704 of PERA expressly limits the obligation to
meet and discuss with first level supervisors to "matters deemed to
be bargainable for other public employes covered by this act."
43
Therefore, because reclassification is not a bargainable item for
rank-and-file employees, it is not a meet and discuss item for super-
visory employees. In sum, the public employer is free to unilaterally
reclassify first level supervisory positions."
It should be noted that the PLRB was careful to prevent reclas-
sifications by public employers from being used as a means of under-
mining union representation. Thus, a reclassification will merely
result in a change of job titles within a certified bargaining unit. The
public employer must initiate unit clarification proceedings before
the PLRB in order to remove employees from a certified unit.45 In
effect, two actions are necessary. First, the public employer must re-
classify the employees. Second, the employer must establish that the
employees are not properly members of the previously certified bar-
gaining units because of a change in their job function.
Treating job classification matters as a meet and discuss item is
consistent with the intent to restrict bargaining over certain critical
management functions expressed by the Hickman Commission Re-
port.46 Requiring the employer to initiate unit clarification proceed-
ings before it can remove employees from one bargaining unit into a
different bargaining unit represented by a different union or into a
position without union representation, guards against reclassifica-
tions being used to deny employees their statutory right to collective
bargaining. The balance thus struck by the PLRB between the em-
ployer's right to manage and direct the work force, and the employ-
ees' right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, is a fair one.
IV. Union Representration and the Duty to Bargain
Questions of who the public employer must bargain with can
occur after the resolution of representation questions and the certifi-
43. Section 704 of PERA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.704 (Purdon Supp. 1979), pro-
vides,
Public employers shall not be required to bargain with units of first level supervisors
or their representatives but shall be required to meet and discuss with first level su-
pervisors or their representatives, on matters deemed to be bargainable for other pub-lc employes covered by this act.
44. See PLRB v. Commonwealth, 9 P.P.E.R. $ 9061 at 120 (PLRB 1978).
45. A public employer can still promote an employee to a position outside the certified
unit. See PLRB v. Commonwealth, 9 P.P.E.R. 9165 (PLRB 1978) (Final Order).
46. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra. In County of Northampton, 10 P.P.E.R.
10010 (PLRB 1978), the Board indicated that job classification issues would "at most" be
meet and discuss issues under § 702. Apparently, the Board believes that some classification
questions may not give rise to the obligation to meet and discuss.
cation of the union as the bargaining representative of the employ-
ees. Particular problems arise out of the concept of exclusivity of
representation and the dual status of supervisors under PERA.
A. Exclusive Representation and the Duty to Bargain
In Peters Township School District4 7 the PLRB addressed the
question of an employee's right to deal directly with the employer
without the intervention of the certified representative. The case
arose out of the school district's refusal to consider the grievance of a
member of the certified bargaining unit which was presented outside
of the established contractual grievance procedure.
The employee filed an unfair practice charge alleging that sec-
tion 606 of PERA gave her a statutory right to have her grievance
considered independent of the certified representative. The PLRB
disagreed with the complainant's interpretation of the Act. Section
606, the relevant portion of the Act, provides as follows:
Representatives selected by public employes in a unit appropriate
for collective bargaining purposes shall be the exclusive represen-
tative of all the employes in such unit to bargain wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment; Provided, that any indi-
vidual employe or a group of employes shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to the employer and to have them ad-
justed without the intervention of the bargaining representative as
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a col-
lective bargaining contract then in effect; And, provided, further,
that the bargaining representative has been given an opportunity
to be present at such adjustment.48
Section 606 is almost identical to the language of section 9(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act.49 Although the first proviso of
the section relied on by the complainant has never been interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, the PLRB found a decision of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,5" and several opinions of the
NLRB's General Counsel interpreting section 9(a) of the National
Act,5' to be persuasive authority regarding the interpretation of sec-
tion 606.52
In Black- Clawson Co. v. International Association of Machin-
ists53 an employee covered by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement sought to compel arbitration of the merits of his discharge
through the grievance procedure. The employer brought an action
47. 8 P.P.E.R. 81 (PLRB 1977).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1976).
50. Black-Clawson v. IAM, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
51. See also Malone v. United States Postal Service, 526 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1975);
Braneman v. A. & P. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1965).
52. See Community College of Allegheny County, 8 P.P.E.R. 305 (PLRB 1977), for a
discussion of the use of federal precedent in the interpretation of § 606 of PERA.
53. 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
for a declaratory judgment barring the arbitration on the basis that
the grievance was not arbitrable. The employee argued in part that
the first proviso of section 9(a) gave the employee a statutory right to
have his grievance adjusted by the employer in a manner consistent
with the collective bargaining agreement, which was separate and
distinct from any contractual right to arbitration. The court, exam-
ining the legislative history and the language of section 9(a) as a
whole, reached a different conclusion. It stated,
Despite Congress' use of the word "right", which seems to import
an indefeasible right mirrored in a duty on the part of the em-
ployer, we are convinced that the proviso was designed merely to
confer upon the employee the privilege to approach his employer
on personal grievances when his union reacts with hostility or apa-
thy.54
The PLRB adopted the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
federal statutory language in its entirety in the interpretation of sec-
tion 606 in Peters Township School District" and dismissed the un-
fair practice charge. Although federal precedents can not always be
readily applied in the interpretation of PERA,56 the Peters Township
decision was properly decided by the PLRB. The decision in Black-
Clawson was well-known prior to the enactment of PERA and is
based on important policy considerations. Substantial benefits re-
dound to all parties when the administration of a collective bargain-
ing agreement is within the exclusive control of the certified
representative. Exclusive union control of access to the mechanisms
of contract enforcement tends to foster greater uniformity, effective-
ness, and overall equity in contract administration.57 The Penn-
sylvania courts recognized these policy considerations by refusing to
grant individual employees access to arbitration or the courts to en-
force a collective bargaining agreement absent clear language in the
contract permitting individual enforcement actions. 8 In sum, the
PLRB's narrow construction of the first proviso of section 606 ap-
pears to have a sound basis in legislative intent, and in important
policy considerations supporting the principle of exclusive represen-
tation.
54. Id. at 185. The court noted that portions of the House Reports concerning the federal
legislation support the conclusion that the proviso in question was intended to permit, but not
require, an employer to consider individual employee grievances. Viewing the section as a
whole the court observed, "The office of a proviso is seldom to create substantive rights and
obligations; it carves exceptions out of what goes before." Id quoting Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 624 (1956).
55. 8 P.P.E.R. 81 (PLRB 1977).
56. See, e.g., PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 499, 337 A.2d 262,
264 (1975).
57. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV. 601, 625-27 (1956).
58. See Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Gardocki v.
Commonwealth, 42 Pa. Commw. Ct. 579, 401 A.2d 410 (1979); McCluskey v. Commonwealth,
37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 598, 391 A.2d 45 (1978).
B. Cross- Unit Representation and the Duty to Bargain
PERA permits first level supervisors to organize for the purpose
of meeting and discussing, but it expressly prohibits the inclusion of
supervisors in rank-and-file employee bargaining units.5 9 Moreover,
under PERA, as under the federal private sector labor law, supervi-
sors are agents of management, and the employer is liable for unfair
labor practices committed by its supervisors.6" Under the federal
private sector law, however, supervisors are not permitted to union-
ize. Thus, supervisors have a unique status under PERA, and they
may be both agents of management and members of the same union
representing the rank-and-file employees they supervise.
In PLRB v. Commonwealth6t the public employer refused to
bargain with designated representatives of the rank and file bargain-
ing unit who were also first level supervisors, and the union filed an
unfair labor practice charge. The basic issues were whether mem-
bers of a first level supervisory bargaining unit could represent rank-
and-fie employees in bargaining sessions and grievance meetings,
and whether members of rank-and-file bargaining units could
represent first level supervisors in similar preceedings; that is,
whether cross-unit representation was permissible.
In its nisi decision62 the PLRB ruled that the right to select an
employee representative created by section 40163 is, by implication,
limited by sections 604(5) and 704. 4 It stated,
[Slupervisory and nonsupervisory employes have complete and
separate interests in their dealings with the employer. Due to the
different interests, there is a real possibility that a conffict could
arise in the manner in which certain matters could and would be
pursued by representatives in cross unit situations. There is an
inherent conflict of interest where an employe, who is a first level
supervisor under Section 301(6) of the Act, bargains on behalf of
employes who are rank and file employes and which he super-
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See also id. at § 1101.704.
60. See, e.g., Duquesne School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 351 (PLRB 1973). See also PLRB v.
Bethel Park School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 2 (PLRB 1976).
61. 40 Pa. Commw. Ct. 468, 397 A.2d 858 (1979).
62. 6 P.P.E.R. 89 (PLRB 1975), rev'd, 8 P.P.E.R. 308 (PLRB 1977), af'd, 40 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 468, 397 A.2d 858 (1979).
63. Section 401 of PERA states,
It shall be lawful for public employes to organize, form, join or assist in employe
organizations or to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid and protection or to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own free choice and such employes shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities, except as may be required pursuant to a main-
tenance of membership provision in a collective bargaining agreement.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
64. Section 704 of PERA states,
Public employers shall not be required to bargain with units of first-level super-
visors or their representatives but shall be required to meet and discuss with first-
level supervisors or their representatives on matters deemed to be bargainable for
other public employes covered by this act.
Id. at § 1101.704. See also id. at § 1101.604.
vises, with the same employer. We cannot permit this possibility
to exist. We must protect the integrity of each group and assume
that the interests of each shall be pursued to the fullest extent.
This is true for both collective bargaining and in pursuing griev-
ances."
65
Based on the above rationale, the nisi order dismissed the unfair
practice charge.
The PLRB reversed its position in its final order.66 Upon recon-
sideration of the question, the Board placed considerable weight on
section 1801(a), which deals specifically with the general problem of
conflict of interest, but is silent on the question of cross-unit repre-
sentation.67 The Board determined that it could not place limits on
the freedom to select the employee representative on the basis of a
conflict of interest, absent specific statutory language. Sections
604(5) and 704 in the Board's opinion were insufficient to overcome
the legislative silence concerning the problem of cross-unit represen-
tation in light of the specific language of section 1801(a). The com-
monwealth court affirmed the rationale of the Board's final order
and dismissed the Commonwealth's appeal.68
The Board's about face in this case reflects the inherent diffi-
culty of the cross-unit representation problem. Clearly, there is a
conflict of interest when a first level supervisor, an agent of the em-
ployer, acts as the representative of rank-and-file employees in nego-
tiations with his employer and vice versa. The question that arises is
whether the legislature intended to accept this conflict as part of an
obvious legislative compromise over the status of first level supervi-
sors, or intended to prohibit it pursuant to the limitations on the
rights of first level supervisors contained in sections 604(5) and 704, a
classic problem of statutory interpretation. Both the PLRB and the
commonwealth court were forced to choose between placing greater
emphasis on what they perceived to be the desired goals of the legis-
lature based on the statute as a whole (the nisi order) or the more
narrow, logical implications of a particular statutory provision (the
final order). The two PLRB decisions underscore the difficulty
presented by the cross-unit representation problem and demonstrate
that in resolving a problem of imprecise draftsmanship, there is no
necessarily correct answer.
V. Waiver of the Right to Bargain
One of the most significant developments under PERA is the
willingness of the PLRB to give full force and effect to collectively
65. 6 P.PE.R. at 90.
66. 8 P.P.E.R. 308 (PLRB 1977), aJ'd, 40 Pa. Commw. Ct. 468, 397 A.2d 858 (1979).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1801(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
68. 40 Pa. Commw. Ct. 468, 397 A.2d 858 (1979).
bargained waiver and integration or "zipper" clauses. Nevertheless,
careful draftsmanship is necessary to fulfill indirectly the bargaining
obligation through such a provision in the labor agreement.
A4. Waynesboro Area Board of School Directors
In Waynesboro Area Board of School Directors69 the employer
unilaterally implemented a no-smoking policy during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement. The union filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges when the employer failed to retract the policy or bargain
with the union over the change in working conditions.7"
The employer defended the action on the ground that the union
expressly waived the right to bargain pursuant to a waiver and inte-
gration provision in the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
That clause provided as follows:
The Employer and the Association acknowledge that during
the negotiations which resolved in this Collective Bargaining
Agreement, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make
demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not
removed by law from the area of collective bargaining, and that
the understanding and agreements arrived at by the parties after
the exercise of that right and opportunity are set forth in this Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement. Therefore, the Employer and the
Association, for the life of this Collective Bargaining Agreement,
each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each
agrees that the other shall not be obligated to bargain collectively
with respect to any subject or matter not specifically referred to or
covered in this Collective Bargaining Agreement, even though
such subject or matter may not have been within the knowledge or
contemplation of either or both of the parties at the time that they
negotiated or executed this Agreement.
Upon prior mutual written agreement, the parties may, but
shall not be obligated to, negotiate or renegotiate any subject or
matter. Any agreement reached in such manner shall be reduced
to writing, signed by the parties and treated as an addendum to
this Collective Bargaining Agreement.71
In its nisi decision 72 the PLRB held that this provision fulfilled
the employer's duty to bargain, as well as the obligation to meet and
discuss, on any and all items whether or not included in the labor
agreement, or discussed or contemplated by the parties in their nego-
tiations. After reviewing both the federal73 and Pennsylvania prece-
dent,74 the PLRB, in its final order,75 affirmed and ruled that a party
69. 9 P.P.E.R. 9066 (PLRB 1978) and 10 P.P.E.R. 10048 (PLRB 1979).
70. A public employer's unilateral action that alters a working condition within the am-
bit of mandatory subjects of bargaining violates the duty to bargain under PERA. See gener-
ally J. THRUSH, PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC EMPLOYE LABOR RELATIONS 139-48 (1st ed. 1977).
71. 9 P.P.E.R. 9066 at 132.
72. 9 P.P.E.R. 9066 (PLRB 1978), af9'd, 10 P.P.E.R. § 10048 (PLRB 1979).
73. See notes 76-84 infra.
74. The PLRB made specific reference to Chambersburg Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R.
to a collective bargaining agreement may waive its right to bargain-
ing regardless of whether there is a specific reference in the waiver
provision to the matter at issue.
B. The Federal Precedent
Initially, the National Labor Relations Board required that a
contractual provision specifically refer to the condition of employ-
ment in question in order to give rise to a valid waiver.76 More re-
cent NLRB authority allows for a waiver of the bargaining
obligation without specific reference to the employment condition in
question in appropriate circumstances. In Radioear Corp. I " the
NLRB suggested four criteria to be considered in this regard:
(a) the precise wording of, and emphasis placed upon, any zip-
per clause agreed upon;
(b) other proposals advanced and accepted or rejected during
bargaining;
(c) the completeness of the bargaining agreement as an "integra-
tion"-hence the applicability or inapplicability of the parol
evidence rule; and
(d) practices by the same parties, or other parties, under other
collective-bargaining agreements.78
After an unsuccessful attempt to defer to arbitration in Radioear
Corp. I, the NLRB examined the waiver clause in light of the above
criteria in Radioear Corp. 1J.79 At issue was the employer's unilat-
eral termination of a "turkey money" bonus. After examining the
bargaining history of the parties, the NLRB determined that the
union had a full opportunity to raise all relevant issues in bargain-
ing, and had actually sought a "maintenance of standards" provision
without success. The majority reasoned that there was "a conscious,
knowing waiver of any bargaining obligation as to non-specified
benefits."" o
Despite the assertions of the dissenting members, who feared
that a process of case-by-case adjudication would give rise to "the
vagaries of supposition, hypothesis, and guesswork,"8 the federal
circuit court opinions support the result reached by the majority in
Radioear Corp. H1. In NLRB v. Southern Materials Co.82 the Fourth
Circuit reversed the NLRB's finding of an unfair labor practice and
1 9080 (PLRB 1978); Keystone School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 1 9058 (PLRB 1978); and Bucks
County Area Vo-Tech School, 6 P.P.E.R. 230 (PLRB 1975).
75. 10 P.P.E.R. § 10048 (PLRB 1979).
76. See, e.g., Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
77. 199 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1972).
78. Id.
79. 214 N.L.R.B. 362 (1974).
80. Id at 364.
81. Id. at 366 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
82. 447 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1971).
ruled that a broad waiver provision83 satisfied the NLRB's require-
ment of "clear and unmistakable" language giving rise to a valid
waiver of bargaining rights even when the language of the waiver
clause did not expressly refer to the terminated benefit. The Tenth
Circuit also followed this approach in NLRB v. Auto Crane Co.84
C The Extension of Waynesboro
Consistent with the federal authority, the PLRB resisted any
rigid rule regarding collectively bargained waiver provisions and in-
stead examined these provisions on a case-by-case basis. In City of
Erie85 the PLRB rejected the employer's contention that the union
waived its right to bargain over the employer's unilateral imposition
of a residency requirement on the ground that the waiver must be
clear and unmistakeable to fulfill indirectly the obligation of good
faith bargaining.86
Nevertheless, the current trend of PLRB decisions is to give full
force and effect to collectively bargained waiver provisions, and the
PLRB will not contradict the plain meaning of the language of a
labor agreement.87 In cases involving residency requirements,88 no
smoking policies, 89 and subcontracting 9° during the term of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the PLRB held that the public employer
83. The waiver clause in Southern Materials provided,
The Company and the Union for the life of said Agreement, each voluntarily
and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obli-
gated to bargain collectively with respect to any subject matter referred to or covered
in this Agreement, or with respect to any subject matter not specifically referred to or
covered in this Agreement.
Id. at 17.
84. 536 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1976). The waiver clause in Auto Crane stated in part as
follows:
Therefore, the Company and the Union for the life of this Agreement, each vol-
untarily and unqualifiedly waives the right and each agrees that the other shall not be
obligated to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred to, or
covered in this Agreement, or with respect to any matter or subject not specifically
referred to or covered in this Agreement, even though such subjects or matters may
not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of either or both parties at the
time they negotiated or signed this agreement.
Id. at 312.
85. 9 P.P.E.R. 9123 (PLRB 1978).
86. The PLRB stated,
Where the language used by the parties raises doubts as to what their intention was in
including such a provision it is no more logical to infer a waiver than to conclude that
the parties did not intend such a result. Where such a case occurs. . . we must give
the provision in question the narrowest reading thus promoting the general policy of
encouraging parties to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment.
Id. at 263.
87. This is so even when the waiver and integration clause is less comprehensive than the
provision in Waynesboro. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Venango County Bd. of
Assist.) 10 P.P.E.R. 10013 (PLRB 1978).
88. See, e.g., Keystone School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9058 (PLRB 1978).
89. Chambersburg Area School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 10099 (PLRB 1979); Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania (Venango County Bd. of Assist.), 10 P.P.E.R. 10013 (PLRB 1978); Waynes-
boro Area Bd. of School Dirs., 9 P.P.E.R. 9066 (PLRB 1978).
90. Harrisburg School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 10116 (1979).
indirectly fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good faith, or con-
versely, the union waived its right to bargain over these items, when
the collective bargaining agreement was silent on the particular em-
ployment condition and also contained a broad waiver clause.
This approach is sound because the PLRB should give effect to
the entire agreement as written rather than pick and choose between
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that it deems to
be "boilerplate."' It is reasonable to presume that the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement do not carefully write into a sol-
emnly negotiated agreement words intended to have no effect.92
Moreover, requiring the parties themselves to resolve the problem of
the duty to bargain during the term of the agreement is consistent
with the basic purposes of the duty to bargain as defined by PERA.
VI. Conclusion
The case-by-case evolution of the duty to bargain under PERA
evinces that legislation could not anticipate, address, and resolve all
the issues and problems likely to arise. Indeed, more particular leg-
islation than that imposing an obligation to bargain in good faith, in
all likelihood, would require more litigation and inject greater un-
certainty into the bargaining relationship. It is unlikely that it would
clarify the law.
Nine years of experience under PERA, and the lesson provided
by the federal private sector labor law, indicate that the problems
surrounding the duty to bargain are better resolved through the liti-
gation process than by additional legislative action.93 A new statu-
tory pattern would only raise new questions and uncertainty.
Therefore, despite the inherent ambiguity of Article VII of PERA,
the best resolution of duty to bargain issues occurs within the flexible
framework of the existing statutory language as it is interpreted by
the PLRB and the courts.
JOHN D. RAUP
LEE STRICKLER
91. See County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent
Union, 476 Pa. 27, 37 n.17, 381 A.2d 849, 854 n.17 (1977) ("we are obliged to take the agree-
ment as the parties wrote it").
92. See John Deere Tractor Co., 5 Lab. Arb. & Disp. SettI. 631, 632 (Updegraff, Arb.,
1946).
93. This is the conclusion reached by the Governor's Study Commission. GOVERNOR'S
STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC EMPLOYE RELATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE
AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING LAWS OF PENN-
SYLVANIA, June 1, 1978, 19.
